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17 FEBRUARY 1969
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SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY

This report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia available to NSA as of 2000Z, 16 February 1969. All information in this report is based entirely on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.

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SITUATION SUMMARY

Vietnamese Communist communications continue to indicate Communist concern over Allied activity in many areas of South Vietnam. In Military Region (MR) 5 and Nam Bo Communist units are still making preparations to conduct attacks.

NVA elements in the DMZ area, while making plans to observe a TET cease fire, are preparing to conduct small-scale attacks of a defensive nature. Communist units in MR Tri-Thien-Hue also appear to be preoccupied with Allied operations in their area.

In Quang Nam Province, an unidentified Front 4 authority discussed troop movements and Allied operations. In the Pleiku-Binh Dinh-Phu Bon area, a battalion of the NVA 95B Regiment sent a new year's greeting to one of its companies using morale-boosting phrases which have sometimes preceded the initiation of Communist attacks. Three units accomplished significant moves in the Kontum-Pleiku border area, and the Darlac Provincial Unit has begun a southwesterly move.

In Nam Bo elements of the NVA 1st Division, apparently assisted by sapper and engineer units, continue to prepare for tactical activity. Meanwhile, additional units have been noted in the southernmost portion of Phuoc Long Province.

In Quang Binh Province, North Vietnam, increased reporting of Allied aircraft activity has been ordered.

Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the three remaining members of the Allied aircraft downed on 12 February reportedly have been turned over to the Cambodian Operational Command Post of MR 1.

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I. SOUTH VIETNAM

A. COMMUNIST ACTIVITY

1. DMZ Area

NVA elements in the DMZ area, apparently planning, at least initially to observe a TET cease fire, later reacted to Allied operations by planning to effect small-scale attacks. SIGINT has revealed that previously unidentified NVA radio-telephone communications group serves elements of the NVA 38th Artillery Regiment, and that an unidentified Hq, NVA B5 Front subordinate (M0973) is the suspected Hq, NVA 246th Regiment.

On 14 February, Group 31 instructed Units 1 and 2 (probable local force units) to carry out the Front's cease fire order but to be prepared to strike the enemy. The units were warned that Allied forces would probably intensify reconnaissance and psychological warfare during the TET holidays.

Later on 14 February, an element of Group 31 reported Allied efforts to plow a wide strip in the area of Hills 69 (16-51N 107-00E, YD 132645) and 27 (16-52N 107-02E, YD 165658). Reportedly, 22 plows supported by 7 tanks were engaged in this activity and it was suggested to the group that Company 13 attack with 60-mm mortars. On 15 February, the group ordered Unit 2 to attack the enemy plowing operation with infantry and mortars, possibly coordinating with the 5th Company, 27th Battalion.

On 15 February, Group 31 stated that a Company of the 27th Battalion had not been carrying out its mission; specifically, it had not attacked Allied reconnaissance teams operating along the Ben Hai River. The battalion was further informed that preparations were being made for a "Phase 2" but that Company must first complete "Phase 1."

An unidentified subordinate (M0973) of Hq, NVA B5 Front has been tentatively identified as Hq, NVA 246th

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Regiment. Communications of Group 31 on 10 February provided initial SIGINT evidence of the 246th Regiment's operations in the DMZ area. The suspected Hq, NVA 246th Regiment has probably communicated with the probable Hq, NVA 164th Artillery Regiment since early February.

A previously unidentified NVA radiotelephone communications group, observed since mid-January, has been identified as serving elements of the NVA 38th Artillery Regiment. SIGINT reveals that this group, currently operating in the southeastern Quang Binh Province-DMZ area, is composed of Hq, 38th Regiment, its probably 2d and 3d Battalions, and two unidentified subordinates.

(2/O/VCM/R103-69, 141940Z; 2/O/VCM/R102-69, 141755Z;
2/G11/VCM/T1289-69, 151221Z; T1262-69, 14145.Z; T1296-69,
151642Z; and T1299-69, 151535Z) ~~(SECRET SPOKE)~~

2. Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue

Communications of MR Tri-Thien-Hue (TTH) elements have reflected the collaterally reported Operation Dewey Canyon, in the A Shau Valley area. SIGINT reveals that the NVA 804th Battalion, Group 5 is located about 15 km west of Hue and suggests that Front 6 has moved eastward.

Communications of Hq, MR TTH reflected the collaterally reported Operation Dewey Canyon being conducted by elements of the 9th USMC Regiment. On 2 February, a regional element reported that Allied forces were receiving artillery support from Hill 400 (unlocated). Later on 14 February, an unidentified MR TTH entity (M4304) reported Allied helicopter movements in the area. Specifically, these communications disclosed that the Allies' deepest penetration was near coordinates 16-22N 107-04E (YD 211098); they also reported that the Communists had "annihilated" elements of the 3rd Battalion, 9th USMC Regiment and were defending an area along an unspecified road against two Allied units. In the messages it was reported that the Allies

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
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were located between coordinates 16-24N 107-03E (YD 193151) and 16-22N 107-03E (YD 196097). Later on that date, the MR TTH entity reported Allied helicopter and infantry movements in the Hill 400 area, as well as Allied artillery fire from "CKV" (NVA designator for Fire Support Base Cunningham, 16-23N 107-02E (YD 185131)).

Limited information on 13 February suggests that the Hq, 804th Battalion was possibly located near 16-27N 107-25E (YD 583211), approximately 15 km west of Hue which represents a 36 km move eastward from its 19 November location near 16-27N 107-04E (YD 220209).

(2/G11/VCM/R045-69, 141055Z) ~~(SECRET SPOKE)~~

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3. Military Region 5

Activities in the region were highlighted by tactical communications of Front 4 forces in Quang Nam Province, and elements of NVA 95B Regiment in southwestern Binh Dinh Province. Other activity consisted of unit moves, discussion of an early TET celebration, road building activity in Kontum Province, and the identification of two units in the Kontum-Pleiku Province border area.

In Quang Nam Province, an unidentified Front 4 Authority (B2268) discussed troop movements and Allied operations on 14 February. On that date the authority warned a 2d Battalion, probably of the NVA 36th Regiment, that a possible Allied troop landing would occur at Go Noi (possibly at 15-52N 108-10E, AT 9755). In the message it was stated, in part, that on the night of 19 February "the troops will cross the river," probably referring to an impending movement of Communist troops. This Front 4 Authority then directed the 2d Battalion's 3d Company to move to Hamlet 1, Dien Chinh (15-52N 108-02E, BT 020540), and reported that "District 2's" troops would move to Hamlet 4, Dien Chinh, and that the 402d Sapper Battalion would move to Dien Phuyen (unlocated).

In the Pleiku-Binh Dinh-Phu Bon border area on 15 February, the 1st Battalion probable NVA 95B Regiment sent a new year's greeting to its 2d Company. In this greeting, the battalion headquarters stated that the past year had been one of victory which would go down in history, and conveyed the congratulations of the battalion commander and Party committee to every soldier in the battalion for past victories achieved and victories to be achieved in the new year. This type of message has in the past been observed just prior to the initiation of Vietnamese Communist attacks. The 1st Battalion was located near 13-49N 108-23E (BR 172276) on 11 February and its 2d Company near 14-05N 108-32E (BR 330567) on 10 February.

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Activities in the western highlands were largely limited to the Kontum-Pleiku Province border area. An early TET celebration was ordered in northern Pleiku and units in southwestern Kontum Province were informed of road construction plans in their area. Three units accomplished moves in the border area of the two provinces and two others have been identified as sapper battalions.

Plans for an early celebration of TET, possibly at 1300 hours (G) on 15 February, and for subsequent attacks by Communist elements were contained in a 14 February message from a B3 Front associated Military Intelligence element (I0291) to a subordinate (I0378). This subordinate was further instructed to continue its reconnaissance of Route 14 until the time it leaves for "the upcoming mission." Both the control authority and its subordinate area located in northern Pleiku Province.

The probable Hq, NVA 24th Regiment was located near 14-12N 107-43E (YA 941700), on 14 February in extreme north-eastern Pleiku Province and about 15 km northeast of its position three days earlier. An associate (M3226) of the NVA B3 Front moved from extreme southwestern Kontum to a point 45 km west of Kontum city during the period 13 December-14 February. This associate was located on the latter date near 14-27N 107-33E (YA 795986). Nearby, an unidentified unit (M5224) was located on 15 February in the area of 14-15N 107-35E (YA 795752), 50 km west-southwest of Kontum city and 18 km west-southwest of this unit's location on 3 February.

Meanwhile, two suspected sapper battalions were identified in SIGINT. One of these (M2307), the suspected VC 37th Sapper Battalion, was last located on 13 February in the eastern Kontum-Pleiku border area. The other (M1004), the suspected VC 408th Sapper Battalion, was last located on 12 February in extreme southwestern Kontum Province. The suspected VC 37th Sapper Battalion maintains communications with the Hq, NVA B3 Front and with the probable Hq, 24th

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Regiment. The suspected VC 408th Sapper Battalion currently communicates with, Hq, B3 Front.

In other activities in Kontum Province, two units (M5290 and M5291) associated with the NVA 40th Artillery Regiment discussed road construction, the location of an ammunition cache, and difficulties imposed by Allied operations on 14 February. One of these units (M5291) reported that a road was to be cut from Hill 994 (14-27N 107-41E, YA 903993) to Hill 816 (13-33N 107-39E, 876002). One of these units (M5290) was located near 14-34N 107-33E (YB 740290) on 18 December, and the other (M5291) near 14-16N 107-45E (YA 790786) on 7 February.

To the south, in Darlac Province, the probable Darlac Provincial Unit was located near 12-33N 108-21E (BP 107850) on 14 February, 42 km east-southeast of Ban Me Thuot, and 10 km west-southwest of this unit's location two days earlier.

(2/G12/VCM/R164-69, 151545Z; R161-69, 141805Z; R159-69, 141400Z; R158-69, 141249Z; R155-69, 140830Z; T358-69, 160235Z; T354-69, 151430Z; 2/O/VCM/R104-69; 141752Z; R108-69, 142158Z)

~~(SECRET SPOKE)~~

4. Nam Bo Subregions

Continuing activity by the NVA 1st Division in Tay Ninh Province and activity in Phuoc Long Province have been noted in recent communications.

Reports of a B-52 strike and Allied ground force follow-up, and Communist plans to guide a sapper unit to its objective were the subjects of 14 and 15 February messages between the Military Intelligence Section (MIS); Hq, NVA 1st Division and a subordinate in Tay Ninh Province.

On 14 February the MIS was informed by the subordinate (I0359) that on 12 and 13 February Allied forces

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had "unleashed" B-52's and that Allied infantry had searched from H-4 (unidentified) back to the "Labor Union" (unidentified). The following day the subordinate was instructed to send someone to meet an unidentified sapper unit, and if this meeting was not effected, the subordinate was to dispatch a team to meet the sapper unit at H-4 and assure that cadre of the sapper unit were led to the location of their objective. On 15 February the subordinate (I0359) was instructed to carefully assess the entire situation in its area of activity and at Cau Khoi (11-16N 106-14E, XT 340450). The MIS was located near 11-30N 106-14E (XT 342702) on 7 February and the subordinate was located near 11-22N 106-16E (XT 377544) on 6 February.

Messages of 12 and 15 February passed to the MI Section (MIS) Hq, NVA 1st Division by the same subordinate (I0359) revealed that various regiments of the 1st Division had infiltrated Village 3 (unlocated), Ben Cui (11-16N 106-21E, XT 470460) and Route 2 (possibly Route 239). The subordinate also reported that it was supporting both sapper and engineers and that two reconnaissance teams had already entered Village 3.

The unidentified subordinate (M4044) of the Probable Hq, Vietnamese Communist 96th Artillery Regiment, which was located in the extreme southern portion of Phuoc Long Province near 11-51N 106-54E (YT 081515) on 12 February, reported its arrival at a new location at 1100 (GOLF) on 11 February. The subordinate also stated that the men and weapons were all safe, contact had been made with an unidentified personality THANH (THANH), and that arrangements had been made to move with THANH's element back to the assembly area. There is a THANH associated with the Hq, VC 274th Regiment.

On 15 February, an unidentified subordinate (M5222) of the Hq Element, VC 5th Division was located in Southern Phuoc Long Province near 11-20N 106-52E (YT 040531), approximately 14 km northwest of its 5 February location.

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In an undetermined area of Nam Bo, plans for company and platoon-sized "raids, ambushes and shellings" were discussed in 10 February voice communications serving an unlocated and unidentified element. The message disclosed the location of Allied troops at Suoi Dat (unlocated) and directed the recipient to take precautionary measures against Allied "commandoes" who are engaged in reconnaissance. The unidentified element further ordered the apparent subordinate to shoot at low-flying aircraft and to assist "Group 70" in transporting all supplies to the reserve base.

(2/G10/VCJ/R046-69, 151452Z; 2/G10/VCM/T0492-69, 151318Z;
T0488-69, 150745Z; 2/O/VCM/R107-69, 142133Z) ~~(SECRET SPOKE)~~

B. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

Possible Communist Attacks

A 14 February South Vietnamese Police message concerning communist attack plans, indicated that "I Corps will be hit very hard." According to the message, Hue and Quang Tin would be "hit hard" this time, whereas Danang would sustain only "light attacks". No dates were given for the attacks.

Also in I Corps, two VC companies are preparing to shell and harass Hieu Nhon District, Hoi An (15-53N 108-18E, BT 1558), and Allied posts in the area "in the near future," according to another 14 February message. In Quang Ngai Province, a communist company intends to attack unidentified locations in Binh Son District between 8 February "and the end of the twelfth lunar month."

In III Corps, Long An Province, the "Communist Dong Nai Battalion" may launch scattered attacks on Tan Tru District, and a main force battalion intends to attack Ben Luc District, according to a 14 February police message.

(2 ☐ /VNP/T94-69, 140550Z; T95-69, 140546Z; T96-69, 140548Z;
T97-69, 14-630Z) ~~(SECRET SPOKE)~~

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II. NORTH VIETNAM

A. INFILTRATION/LOGISTICS ACTIVITY

The initial appearance of Groups 2124, 2126 and QL 4072 was noted on 14 February, together with 275 personnel noted moving northward through the infiltration system. An additional 200 personnel were scheduled to be moved on 15 February.

As of 14 February, a total of 11 new personnel groups have been observed for the month.

(2/0/VCJ/R53-69, 152102Z)
~~(SECRET SPOKE)~~

A total of 10 "friendly" cargo/supply vessels were tracked from 2300Z on 13 February to 2259Z on 14 February by the North Vietnamese Naval radar stations along the central and southern coast of North Vietnam. This is an increase of 3 vessels over the previous 24-hour period. All 10 vessels were tracked in an area extending from 19-02N to 20-03N.

The Sam Son radar station reported at 0032Z to the Haiphong radar controller that he was tracking 100 motorized junks; however, this activity was not reflected in communications.

The actual total of the vessels may be less than that observed since it is often not possible to follow vessels from one radar tracking area to another.

(3/0/□/R39-69; 2/Q1/VCN/R50-69, 150016Z)
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B. GROUND FORCES

Military Region 4

Communications of the Quang Binh Provincial Unit (QBPU) revealed plans for better landline and radio communications as well as for increased air defense preparedness. Additionally, Hq, MR 4 Forward communicated with regional headquarters on 6 February for the first time since late December 1968.

Communications of the QBPU on 14 February contained plans for a new emulation program, reportedly for the regional branch. The campaign, which is to promote better landline and radio communications, is to be conducted in the following three phases: phase one from 14 to 23 February; phase two from 24 February until 5 March; and phase three from 5 March to an undisclosed termination date.

The Hq, QBPU on 14 February directed its 45th Battalion to forward a daily report containing the names of villages over which Allied aircraft had flown as well as the aircraft flight path. On the following day, the battalion notified provincial unit headquarters that one "F4" flew over Thai Thuy and Huong Thuy (both unlocated, but are believed to be in the Le Thuy District, Quang Binh Province) headed toward Vinh Linh. The battalion also mentioned that it heard 12.7-mm machine gun fire emanating from the Vinh Linh area.

Additional analysis has revealed that Hq, MR 4 Forward has communicated with the regional headquarters on only one occasion since late December that being 6 February. In addition, the forward headquarters communicated with Hq, MR Tri-Thien-Hue on 11 February for the first time since 7 February.

(2/G11/VCM/T1252-69, 141420Z; T1293-69, 151306Z; 3/0/ ☐ R35-69;
R33-69)

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C. AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

NVN AN-24 To Return To Hanoi

The North Vietnamese AN-24 that arrived [] on 13 February after a flight from Hanoi is scheduled to return to North Vietnam [] on 17 February. The AN-24 had been scheduled to return to Hanoi on 14 February but the flight was cancelled due to bad weather. A [] VIP-associated IL-18 flew [] to Hanoi on 14 February probably carrying the 19 important passengers that had been scheduled to fly on the NVN AN-24.

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
D. [] COMMUNICATIONS

(2/0/VCY/R95-68, 272121Z NOV)

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III. LAOS

MILITARY SITUATION

Northern Laos

In MR 5, an RLA position located approximately 35 km northeast of Vientiane was attacked by a 50-man Communist unit on 14 February. RLA forces reportedly suffered two killed, while Communist losses were unknown.

(2/GD/LSM/T258-69, 141013Z)

Southern Laos

In Khammouane Province, MR 3, two Pathet Lao (PL)/"VC" companies were located approximately 22 km south of Thakhek (17-24N 104-48E, VE 7923) on 11 February. According to the same RLA message, these units were the ones which had attacked the two RLA positions in the same area the day before. In Savannakhet Province, the PL 18th Infantry Battalion and 26th Independent Battalion are deployed in an area 17 km northwest of Dong Hene (16-42N 105-17E, WD 3046), while an additional PL/NVA company recently set up a position 6 km farther to the northeast.

In a 15 February message from MR 4 headquarters, the situation at Tha Teng (15-26N 106-23E, XC 4906) was reported as "very critical." Communist forces in the area have reportedly increased the "strength of their artillery," and the town has been shelled for the past three days, with two RLA soldiers killed and four wounded. Increased Communist shellings have made evacuation of the wounded "impossible." A message from Tha Teng, also on 15 February, requested that another evacuation of the wounded be attempted and that air strikes be directed against Communist rocket positions north of the town. The RLA further reported that the Communists are likely to renew attacks against Tha Teng and Phou Thiou, 3 km southwest of the town, during the TET festival or soon thereafter.

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In Sedone Province earlier this month, PL forces reportedly formed a new battalion, designated the 705th Battalion, which is currently active 22 km north of Pakse.

On 14 February, the RLA reported that Attapeu had been threatened by Communist forces "from all directions" for three days. Additionally, Ban Phang Sekaman (14-48N 106-50E, XB 9737), just across the Se Kong, was being "continuously harassed" by a force of at least three Communist companies.

(2 ☐ /LSM/T191-69, 150004Z; T196-69, 160006Z; 2/GD/LSM/T260-69, 141013Z; T261-69, 142309Z; T262-69, 150415Z; T283-69, 150415Z) (b) (3) - P.L. 86-36
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IV. CAMBODIA

MILITARY SITUATION

Military Region 1

The three remaining crew members of the "U.S./ARVN L-19" aircraft downed by Cambodian fire on 12 February in Svay Rieng Military Subdivision (MSD) were turned over to the Operational Command Post of MR 1 on 14 February, according to a Cambodian message.

An armored platoon, a light infantry element, and an antiaircraft battery have been sent to the area north of Bavet (11-94N 106-10E, XT 2723), Svay Rieng MSD, because of the activity of approximately 300 U.S./ARVN troops across the border and following the alleged strafing of the Thlok Post (11-04N 106-05E, XT 2224) on 15 February. On the previous day, a U.S./ARVN aircraft had allegedly spread a chemical irritant in the region south of Bavet. Also on 14 February, in Prev Veng MSD, Cambodian defense elements were put on alert after U.S./ARVN helicopters allegedly strafed a Cambodian position at WT 2006 (10-55N 105-11E).

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"In view of frequent U.S./ARVN overflights," the intervention of the Royal Cambodian Air Force was requested in a 12 February message. In a subsequent message three T-28 fighter aircraft were ordered to return immediately to Pochentong Airport outside Phnom Penh.

A rebel band is intending to attack Kauk Srok (11-58N 105-51E; WU 9222) in Kompong Cham MSD, according to a 12 February message. Military and police elements have been sent to the village.

(3/0 [] R39-69; 2 [] CEG/T185-69, 131332Z; 2 [] CEA/T15-69, 140934Z; T16-69, 150411Z; 2 [] CEY/T17-69, 160911Z; T111-69, 140843Z; T114-69, 151110Z; T116-69, 151227Z)

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Military Region 2

A 13 February Cambodian message disclosed that during ARVN-VC skirmishes in South Vietnam on 10 and 11 February several ARVN shells fell into Cambodian territory near the Takeo-Kampot MSD border but caused no damage.

(2 [] CEY/T110-69, 140545Z)

Military Region 3

Cambodian military elements reported a skirmish with "Siamese rebels" at UU 2056 (12-16N 103-25E) on 14 February in which four rebels were killed, including one Vietnamese leader. A later message indicated that half of the rebel band had been located in the Tam Yong River valley between UU 1557 (12-16N 103-17E) and UU 3161 (12-17N 103-28E).

(2 [] CEG/T91-69, 151312Z; T93-69, 160547Z)

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Military Region 5

Between 9 and 11 February, three rebel camps were uncovered during operation "Socialist People's Party" north of Poy (13-50N 107-02E, YA 2029) in Ratanakiri MSD. A total of 71 rebel barracks and two tons of paddy were destroyed.

Military Region 5 Operational Command Post, Mondolkiri MSD, and the 48th Infantry Battalion (Based in Stung Treng MSD) were requested to collect the "Chief of State's reward" for the November 1968 capture of three Vietnamese soldiers in Mondolkiri MSD and three Laotian soldiers in Strung Treng MSD.

Prince SIHANOUK will visit Ratanakiri MSD in March, according to a 14 February message.

(2/[]/CEF/T12-69, 151228Z; 2/[]/CEG/T90-69, 141259Z;
2/[]/CEY/T113-69, 151006Z)

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V. []

[] ACTIVITY

(2X/Q [] T138-69, 151010Z; T140-69, 151012Z)

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